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Abstract
We use a unique hand collected data set of 6,258 auctions from the online football
manager game Hattrick to study determinants and effects of reserve prices. We find
that chosen reserve prices exhibit both very sophisticated and suboptimal behavior by
the sellers. On the one hand, reserve prices are adjusted remarkably nuanced to the
resulting sales price pattern. However, reserve prices are too clustered at zero and at
multiples of e 50,000 as to be consistent with fully rational behavior. We recover the
value distribution and simulate the loss in expected revenue from suboptimal reserve
prices. Finally, we find evidence for the sunk cost fallacy as there is a substantial
positive effect on the reserve price when the player has been acquired previously.
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1 Introduction
In a situation where buyers’ willingness to pay is private information or the identity of the
highest value buyer is unknown, an auction, instead of posting or negotiating a price, can be
an efficient allocation mechanism. Hence, auctions have been used in a wide array of fields
like art sale, real estate, or the allocation of spectrum rights. With the ascent of the internet,
auctions have exceedingly gained popularity on platforms such as eBay.com, amazon.com,
or eBid.com. Alone eBay.com is present in 39 markets and in 2007 approximately 84 million
active users worldwide sold items on eBay trading platforms for nearly $60 billion. I.e.,
eBay.com users worldwide trade more than $1,900 worth of goods on the site every second.1
From various empirical, e.g. Lucking-Reiley (2000), or theoretical, e.g. Myerson (1981), Riley
& Samuleson (1981), or Bulow & Roberts (1989), studies it is obvious that reserve prices
(public minimum bids set by the seller) are an important strategic design element in most
auction environments.2 Using a hand-collected data set of 6,258 auctions of virtual football
players traded in English auctions on hattrick.org we are able to address both positive as
well as normative aspects of reserve price setting. We analyze how reserve prices are set
and where they deviate from theoretically predicted patterns and in addition perform the
counterfactual exercise and show how much expected revenue is actually foregone by setting
suboptimal reserve prices.
The online game Hattrick (HT ) is the world’s largest online football (soccer) manager
game with almost one million participants. Every day about 40,000 virtual players are
traded on the HT transfer market. By design, these trades take place in a highly controlled
environment including a standardized duration for each auction, a fixed mode of how players
on sale are presented, and no risk of default. Sellers are however free to choose a non-
negative reserve price. Unlike many other online auction platforms, in HT there is no
relation between the minimum bid and the transaction fees a seller is charged, which could
bias individuals in their choice of a reserve price. Moreover, when HT players are on the
market, all relevant information concerning their quality becomes publicly available. That
is, there is no information asymmetry between buyers and sellers and hence no scope for
a winner’s curse3 and reserve prices contain no quality signal. Thus, for the bidders the
auction takes place in a context where individual valuations are determined by idiosyncratic
shocks to a common and publicly observable value. In Section 2 we describe the HT auction
1Source: http://news.ebay.com/about.cfm
2Rosenkranz & Schmitz (2007) extend the analysis to non-standard reference point dependent preferences
and show whether and how reserve prices perceived as reference points affect bidding behavior.
3The winner’s curse refers to the fact that the bidder with the highest estimate of quality is likely to
hold a too positive view of the true but unobservable quality (common value), which then forms the basis
of private valuations of the product.
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market in detail and explain how success in the game crucially depends on profitably trading
virtual players.
We are well aware that there may be reservations to working with data from a source like
HT, which is clearly labeled as a game and where all financial transactions are carried out
in terms of virtual money. However, success in the game requires patience and a long-term
planning horizon and according to the developers, an individual manager typically keeps
playing actively for about three years. Moreover, they also state that as many as 500,000
managers visit their account every single day. Above that, even though the basic access
to the game is free of charge, roughly 20% of registered managers not only devote much
of their time to the game, but they also voluntarily invest real money in HT by opting
for a costly premium account.4 These facts underpin our view, partially inferred from own
introspection, that the HT managers are very ambitious and that the game provides rather
strong incentives. Plausibly, the within-game motivation can be regarded as high as that
present in laboratory experiments or small stake internet sales.5 It thus seems reasonable to
retrieve meaningful insights on individual behavior also for real life situations involving real
money.
From the classic contributions to auction theory, e.g. Myerson (1981), Riley & Samuleson
(1981), we know that the optimal reserve price in an independent private value environment
is a continuous function of the hazard rate of the distribution of valuations of buyers and
does not depend on the number of potential bidders. It is set such that the expected
marginal revenue from a higher sales price equals the expected marginal cost from a higher
risk of auction failure.6 In the reserve price patterns in our data, we find both evidence for
very sophisticated and boundedly rational behavior of sellers. We show that reserve prices
are predicted, qualitatively and quantitatively, by the same observable characteristics that
predict sales prices.
4“Supportership” enables a package of further features and tools like bookmarks and statistics at a fee of
about $30 per year on a non-subscription basis. The managers take no technical advantage in their in-game
performance from this supporter status, but it merely “make[s] your time at Hattrick easier as well as
more fun”, as the operators of the game put it. (Source: http://www.hattrick.org/Help/Supporter/)
5Moreover, in a recent study Castronova (2008) provides suggestive evidence that economic constraints
like the law of demand apply similarly in virtual environments with virtual money as they do in the real
world.
6Levin & Smith (1994) and Levin & Smith (1996) analyze alternative models with endogenous (and
costly) entry decisions prior to the bidding stage. In their setting, the number of bidders and the optimal
reserve price actually covary, implying that under IPV small or no reserve prices are optimal as this attracts
more bidders. Conversely, they argue that a positive reserve price is useful in reducing the number of bidders
in a common value auction, since the winner’s curse is the worse the more bidders are participating. However,
in our HT environment costs of entry (bid preparation, information gathering) are negligible and hence we
treat the number of bidders as exogenously given.
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In particular, we find that reserve prices exhibit the so-called “birthday effect” that has
been documented for the HT transfer market sales prices in Englmaier & Schmo¨ller (2009):
Though a player’s value in the game decreases, ceteris paribus, continuously with his age
measured in days as it becomes harder and harder to improve his skills by training, they
show a very strong drop in sales prices just on a player’s birthday. This indicates that buyers
in HT give too much weight to the age of a player measured in years as opposed to his age
measured in days, though the latter is also plainly visible to all buyers free of cost as can be
seen in Figure 1. Our analysis shows that this birthday effect is also present with respect to
reserve prices. Further examination of the data indicates that the presence of the birthday
effect is not (only) due to the fact that sellers fall prey to the same information under-usage
as the buyers, but because at least a substantial fraction of sellers tries to strategically
exploit this bias of the demand side. We find a clustering of sale offers just before players’
birthdays, indicating that sellers rationally want to sell players before they drop in value on
their birthday. Furthermore, a sharp drop of median reserve prices immediately before the
birthday indicates that sellers anticipate the immanent drop in market value. Hence, they
want to make sure that the player is actually sold where a (too) high reserve price might
endanger this.
We run hedonic regressions with the sales price and with the reserve price as dependent
variables and identical sets of explanatory variables. As stated above, all of them have
qualitatively similar effects – with one notable exception: we have a good proxy whether a
player on the transfer market had been acquired by the seller previously or whether he was
promoted (basically for free) from the seller’s own youth team. We find that, ceteris paribus,
sellers set significantly higher reserve prices (by about 23% of the mean) for players they have
bought as compared to players they promoted internally. In contrast to that, sales prices
are significantly lower (17% of the unconditional mean price) for previously traded players
unconditional on a successful sale. In Section 3 we discuss in detail why the negative effect
we observe in sales price patterns is what we would expect from rational actors. However,
the positive reserve price premium we find for previously traded players is more in line with
a sunk cost fallacy, for example due to loss aversion with respect to the previous selling price,
leading to an entitlement effect.
Finally, we find that reserve prices are too clustered as to be compatible with fully rational
behavior. In particular, the reserve price pattern spikes dramatically at multiples of e 50,000,
and also suggests a lower scale clustering at multiples of e 5,000. Moreover, a large fraction
of the sellers (18%) sets a reserve price of zero. We interpret this as evidence for sellers using
a round number heuristic in determining reserve prices, thereby not setting the reserve price
sufficiently fine tuned. We are able to do even more, as from observing the sales prices, in
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the English auction resembling the second highest bidder’s valuation, we are able to estimate
the underlying distributions of valuations, F (v), calculate the optimal reserve prices given
F (v), and calculate the share of expected revenue lost at the actual levels as compared to
the situation with optimal reserve prices.
With the rise of the internet, auction data are more readily available and hence these
data have been widely used to study the effect of various elements of auction mechanisms.
Lucking-Reiley (2000) presents data from a comprehensive study of 142 different internet
auction sites and describes the transaction volumes, the types of auction mechanisms used,
the types of goods auctioned, and the business models employed at the various sites. Bajari
& Hortacsu (2003) go further in their analysis and show that in their sample of coin auctions
on eBay.com, reserve prices are set below the book value of their coins. In contrast, we find
that while many reserve prices are set very low (or even at zero), a substantial fraction is set
very high. As we do, Bajari & Hortacsu (2003) estimate the value distribution F (v) from
the observed bids and use it to evaluate the effect of alternative reserve prices. However,
they do not solve for the optimal reserve price as a benchmark as they cannot rule out
common value elements in their data. The evidence on whether or not reserve prices are
revenue enhancing is somewhat mixed. Ariely & Simonson (2003), Kamins et al. (2004),
and Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) show in field experiments that selling prices increase in the
reserve price. Reiley (2006) documents evidence from a field experiment on ebay that reserve
prices reduce the number of bidders, the probability of an actual sale, and the unconditional
expected revenue. However, the expected revenue conditional on a sale increases. Bajari &
Hortacsu (2003) and Hoppe & Sadrieh (2007) find in their field study and field experiment
respectively no positive effects of reserve prices on selling prices. Finally, Simonsohn et al.
(2008) take a different tack. They document that eBay bidders prefer auctions with more
bids, hence sellers have an incentive to set low reserve prices. Of particular interest to us is
the study by Trautmann & Traxler (2009), which also uses data from auctions of players in
HT. Their focus is to separate two potential channels how reserve prices might affect selling
prices: A reference point or anchoring effect as suggested in Rosenkranz & Schmitz (2007)
and a standard rent appropriation effect that stems from reserve prices forcing the winning
bidder to pay more than the second highest bidders valuation. Trautmann & Traxler (2009)
find a positive effect of reserve prices but they find no evidence that any of these higher prices
stem from a reference point effect but rather can be accounted for by rent appropriation.
The sunk cost fallacy, sometimes referred to as “irrational escalation of commitment”, has
been studied by psychologists for decades, e.g. Staw (1976), Arkes & Blumer (1985), or Baz-
erman (1986). In most recent discussions in economics, it has been related to prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), specifically to a reference point and loss aversion. In many
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contexts, the presence of a sunk cost fallacy implies entitlements. There is ample evidence
for the entitlement effect and the resulting Willingness-to-Pay/Willingness-to-Accept gap in
controlled experiments7, though recent work by Plott & Zeiler (2005; 2007) is critical with
respect to the validity of the endowment and entitlement effects outside the lab. Our study
indicates a strong and persistent entitlement effect in a very competitive natural setting. All
our results are robust if we control for the experience of the sellers in our sample. Genesove
& Mayer (2001) analyze seller behavior in the Boston residential real estate market using
proprietary panel data. Sellers whose condominium’s expected selling price falls below the
original purchase price due to an aggregate market downturn tend to set asking prices well
above the expected price level. They argue that this unwillingness to accept market prices
for property in the down part of the market cycle could stem from loss aversion on behalf of
the sellers. However, in our sample there are no losses caused by business cycle swings, since
all data was collected within only a fortnight. The setting studied in Genesove & Mayer
(2001) involves bargaining, where the final price can fall below the initial asking price of the
seller, which in addition not necessarily reflects his reserve price. It is also reasonable to
assume that the evaluation of a condominium may involve substantial search costs, whereas
all relevant information on HT ’s virtual players is readily available, highly standardized, and
thus easily comparable. Hence, while we observe similar behavior of sellers, the motivations
behind it may differ considerably.
Clustering of stock prices at integers, i.e. that limit sell orders and also prices tend to
be rounded to whole numbers rather than displaying fractions, has been documented by
Niederhoffer (1965), Harris (1991), and Sonnemans (2006), who also provides an overview
of related studies on price clustering in stock markets, discussing possible explanations.
Benartzi & Thaler (2007) show that a round number heuristic seems to be important in
determining savings choices, too.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the
data and the relevant details of HT. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis and results.
In Section 4 we estimate the share of expected revenue lost relative to the optimum and
Section 5 concludes. An Appendix collects additional Tables and Figures.
7For references see e.g. Thaler (1980), Knetsch (1989), Hanemann (1991), Shogren et al. (1994), Casey
(1995), or Carmon & Ariely (2000).
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2 Data Description
2.1 Institutional Background about Hattrick
Hattrick, founded in 1997, is a browser-based free online football manager game with
almost one million registered users, henceforth referred to as “managers”.8 The basic concept
of the game is to manage your own virtual football club, which consists of virtual players that
are represented by a multi-dimensional vector of attributes. A team plays at least one weekly
game in a national league system against teams coached by other managers. In HT, a season,
or an in-game year, lasts for 112 real-time days. The outcome of matches is determined by
random simulation on the basis of the chosen strategies of the opponents, skills of the virtual
players and other factors that determine the probabilities to win. The tasks for a manager to
lead his team to success are numerous, ranging from decisions on match tactics and line-ups,
over hiring team staff like doctors and co-trainers, over “drafting” a new player from the
team’s youth squad and either selling, keeping, or firing him as needed, to monitoring the
team’s training program. Many managers complete all of these tasks almost on a daily basis.
announce The sportive aspect is but one of the supporting pillars of the game. Maintaining
a virtual club requires the managers also to develop a solid financing scheme. The most
important source of (in-game) revenue for a manager is successfully trading players on the
HT transfer market. Most managers follow a “train and trade”-strategy which first ensures
the improvement of quality of their own virtual players by choosing a training scheme and
then profitably selling them to other managers. Since the proceeds from player sales are
the major source of income in HT, the transfer market provides strong incentives for the
participants in this open-ended manager game.
2.2 Goods: The Virtual Players
A virtual player is defined in about thirty dimensions. Figure 1 depicts the typical profile
interface for a player, including the set of his attributes and the corresponding auction details.
The most important attributes are the eight abilities displayed in the lower middle of the
profile which we denote as his “skills”.9 While stamina and set-pieces are general skills, the
remaining six - playmaking, winger, scoring, keeping, passing, and defending - determine a
player’s suitability to play in certain positions in the line-up. For instance, a player with his
best skill being keeping is rationally classified as goalie. In the terminology of the game, skill
8We refer to human users as “managers”, while using “player” to address virtual football players.
9To all other attributes, we will refer to as “characteristics”. For a classification of the values each
attribute can take, refer to Table 1.
6
levels are denoted as adjectives. To simplify the notation, we use integer values to address
them, e.g. “passable” corresponds to score 6 of 20.10
Figure 1: Virtual Player Profile
Notes: Next to the player attributes, on the lower right all information regarding the auction
details are displayed. The seller of this keeper set him on the transfer market during the evening on
February 01, 2008 (i.e. exactly 72 hours before the deadline displayed) at a reserve price of e 25,000.
(Source: www.hattrick.org)
From the set of player attributes, only these eight skills can be actively improved by training.
However, it takes several weeks for an individual player to increase by a full skill level and
only a single skill can be trained at a time. Hence, managers have to specialize in training
only one specific skill, say keeping. As soon as such a keeper-trainee surpasses the threshold
for a skill-up in this skill, the manager can profitably sell him to another manager and assign
the free training slot to a new (and younger) trainee, which he can either acquire on the
transfer market or promote directly from his own youth team.11 The proceeds from the sales
are in turn used to finance the club.
The value of a player crucially depends on two main factors, his current skill levels and his
age. The first determine the strength a player adds to a team if he is currently lined-up
in a certain position for a match. This is independent of a player’s age. For the purpose
of this paper, we refer to this component as his “Consumption Value” (CV). For instance,
a keepers’ CV is almost exclusively driven by the goalkeeping-skill. However, the second
main channel of influence for the value of (young) players arises due to the fact that age is
a key determinant for training effectiveness. In HT, the marginal skill-improvement from
10Table 7 in Appendix 6 shows the detailed ranking of the values for the skill levels, as it can also be
found in the game’s manual.
11Each manager can promote one player from the youth team each week, whose attributes are determined
randomly with a high probability of low skill levels. Age is also randomly assigned on the interval 17 to 19
years. All descriptions of the game are based on the set of rules and institutions that were in place during
the collection period of our data set.
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training declines with the age of a player. The younger a player, the more he benefits
ceteris paribus from training and the faster he advances to a higher skill level, which in turn
increases his CV. As a consequence, a viable training strategy necessarily requires rather
young players, since they have the highest innate potential for further skill development, or
“Advancement Potential Value” (APV) as we label it. Importantly, the marginal effect of
training is otherwise homogeneous for all virtual players, i.e. there exists nothing like a talent-
attribute capturing the potential for skill-improvements. It does to some extent depend on
the ability of the club’s trainer, and the training intensity chosen by the manager, where the
latter two give rise to variation in private valuations.
Ceteris paribus, a player who is just a few days younger than another should not be worth
much more, since the difference in their APV is minimal. This holds true irrespectively of
whether one already turned a year older while the other’s birthday lies just ahead. Yet,
in another dataset from HT Englmaier & Schmo¨ller (2009) find that the observed sales
price pattern exhibits strong discontinuities at the birthdays of the virtual players, which
they refer to as the “birthday effect”. The buyers overreact to the informational content
of the age-group indicator years, while disregarding the finer information on a player’s age
attribute as conveyed through the days, even though the precise age of a player is explicitly
stated in the form “X years and Y days” on his profile page (see Figure 1). Naturally, this
raises the question of whether the reserve prices set by the sellers pick up the birthday effect,
or whether sellers react strategically to the documented buyers’ behavior. Along with the
individual values they can take in the game, Table 1 provides an overview of the player
attributes and other variables we employ for our analysis.12
Among the remaining characteristics, a player’s total skill index (tsi), which represents a
noisy measure for his overall abilities, is the one most likely to have a (positive) influence on
market value. To see this, note that HT calculates the skill-levels as real numbers including
hidden decimal places, the so-called “sub-skills”, while the player profile only displays the
adjective reflecting the current integer value for each skill. With each training a player
receives, the trained skill increases by a marginal increment (which is declining in age), and
so does the tsi. While also correlated to other attributes (e.g. form), the tsi score thus
constitutes a noisy signal for the sub-skills of a player, i.e. for how close he is to reach the
next higher level in one of his skills. Though a complete description of all characteristics is
beyond the scope of this paper, for our empirical estimation we control for the full vector of
attributes.
12In the following, we use italics to denote the variables from our sample.
8
Table 1: List of Variables
Variable Description Range
Player attributes years Age in years (1 HT -year ≡ 112 real-time days) 17+
days Age in days (1 HT -day ≡ 1 real-time day) {0,..,111}
totalage Precise age of a player in day units (normalized) {0,..,335}
days17-days20 Interaction term of days and age-group dummies {0,..,111}
form Current form of player {0,..,8}
total skill index Noisy indicator of overall quality of player N+
wage Salary (exogenous; in virtual Euro) N+
keeper Playing skill, position specific {0,..,20}
playmaking Playing skill, position specific {0,..,20}
winger Playing skill, position specific {0,..,20}
scoring Playing skill, position specific {0,..,20}
passing Playing skill, position specific {0,..,20}
defense Playing skill, position specific {0,..,20}
setpieces Playing skill for all player types {0,..,20}
stamina Playing skill for all player types {0,..,20}
gentleness High value if agreeable (ascending order) {0,..,20}
aggression Low value if player aggressive (descending order) {0,..,20}
honesty High value if honest (ascending order) {0,..,20}
plrexp Experience of player {0,..,20}
ldrshp Leadership qualities of player {0,..,7}
Auction Data askprice Reservation price set by the seller N+
price Auction end price paid by winning bidder N+
dtime Time of deadline hh.mm.ss
dday Day of deadline dd.mm.yy
sellerxp Proxy for seller experience by relative country ranking [0 − 1]
Dummy variables age17 - age19 Dummy for age-group {0,1}
(1=yes, 0=no) peakhour Did auction end during peak hour (5:30 p.m. - 10:00 p.m.) {0,1}
mon - sun On which weekday did the auction end? {0,1}
acquired Proxy for previous sale (player countryID = seller countryID) {0,1}
d ask Was the reserve price different from zero? {0,1}
d sold Was the player successfully sold? {0,1}
2.3 Transactions: The Transfer Market
The transfer market in HT has a large trading volume with an average of about 40,000
players offered for sale each single day.13 The selling mechanism implemented on the transfer
market is an English ascending open bid auction. To sell a player, managers can specify a
non-negative reserve price and submit an irreversible sell order by clicking a button. Each
auction ends exactly 72 hours from submission, but the deadline is automatically extended
by 3 minutes if a bid is placed within 3 minutes to the deadline. This continues until all
bidders but one retire.14 Importantly, all relevant information concerning a players quality
- that is the full attribute vector - becomes publicly available once a player is offered on
the transfer market. Hence, at the time of sale there is no information asymmetry between
buyers and sellers and, for that matter, the econometrician.
13Source: http://www.databased.at/HT/htpe
14Given the reserve price is set below the second highest bidder’s valuation, the transfer price will equal
the second-highest bid plus one discrete increment, i.e. the format is strategically equivalent to a sealed-bid-
second-price auction. For reference on the effects of the employed ending rule on bidding behavior see e.g.
Roth & Ockenfels (2002) and Ariely et al. (2005).
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Since all players on sale are displayed in the same standardized way as shown in Figure 1,
the sellers have no possibility to affect the way how an individual player is presented to
potential buyers. Except for the timing of the sell order, which determines the auction
deadline, this leaves a seller with a single dimension of choice: The reserve price. Thus,
we should expect that sellers give careful consideration to the utilization of this remaining
instrument of potential influence on the auction outcome.
The transfer market provides a search tool, which allows the managers to filter for various
player attributes like age-group, current bid, and up to four playing skills at desired levels.
The inquiry returns a list of offered players matching the selected filter, where an abstract
of their main characteristics is displayed (see Figures 10 and 11 in Appendix 6).
To submit a bid for a player, a prospective buyer manager must enter his profile. Each bid
must at least be equal to the reserve price or above the current highest bid, respectively.
Placed bids are binding and irreversible. After the auction ends, the player is automatically
transferred to the winning manager’s team and the seller receives the winning bid net of
some small fee.15 If a player received no bid, the auction fails and he stays with the seller.
2.4 Sample Selection and Data Description
Our main interest in this paper is to study the determinants and effects of reserve prices. For
this purpose, we collected all publicly available information on 6,258 virtual players offered
for sale on the HT transfer market between November 18, 2007 and December 02, 2007.16
The sample considers the specific subgroup of keepers aged between seventeen - the youngest
age possible in the game - and nineteen years, all with an identical keeping-skill of score 6
out of 20, i.e. “level-6 keepers”. The age criterion is motivated by the facts that (i) the APV
is most important at young ages and (ii) young players are heavily traded. Regarding the
focus on keepers, note that the values of field player types depend not only a combination
of several skills but also on other factors, e.g. the chosen match tactics. In effect, individual
skills can receive quite different weights in the evaluations across managers, making it hard
to measure the impact of a specific attribute on the price, or, as in our case, the reserve
price. In contrast to that, for keepers by far the most influential skill unambiguously is the
keeping-skill, which determines their value to the largest extent. By holding the keeping-
skill constant at a score of 6, which accounts for the thickest market segment of players in
this category, we effectively suppress the impact of variations in the skill-dependent CV on
15These transaction costs are negligibly small and do not affect any of our results.
16From an initial sample of 6,460 players in the relevant skill- and age-group, we excluded 4 players that
play for their respective home country’s national team, 66 players with reserve prices identified as outliers
by Grubbs’ test (Grubbs, 1969) and 132 players that were injured at the time of the auction.
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the observed reserve prices. We are thus able to identify influential factors for the players’
APVs in the sample, which crucially depend on their age, or more precisely, their precise
age including the days.17
Next to all relevant player and auction characteristics, we also collected information on
the sellers. For a subsample of 2,411 auctions we are able to construct a proxy for seller
experience (sellerxp ∈ (0, 1]), where we use the information on how a manager ranks relative
to all other managers within a given country. We argue that a higher ranking within a
country is a good indicator for being more experienced as it can only be achieved by playing
the game for a long period of time and/or being very successful quickly, which should to a
large degree be correlated with having routine playing the game.
Furthermore, we use the information whether a player plays abroad or not, indicated by
a 20% bonus on his wage,18 as a proxy whether he had been previously traded (acquired
= 1), or whether he is a “fresh” player from the seller’s own youth team (acquired = 0).
Fresh players never receive this 20% playing-abroad bonus on their wages, as e.g. German
teams always produce fresh German players. As in roughly 85% of all trades buyer and seller
are not from the same country, our potential mistake from missing trades within a country
is small and this 20% bonus is a good proxy to discriminate between fresh and previously
traded players.
Figure 2: Distributions of Age and Sales
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Figure 2a depicts the age distribution for the players in our sample, indicating a roughly
balanced distribution for days within each age-group. The distribution of sales per weekday
is shown in Figure 2b. On Tuesdays and Wednesdays we observe spikes in the number of
17The motivation for these selection criteria follows the lines of Englmaier & Schmo¨ller (2009). Though
many variables appear in both datasets, the present sample differs from theirs in some respects. In particular,
we additionally collected records of the reserve prices and more details on the individual sellers.
18Note that a player’s wage is exogenously fixed by HT and cannot be influenced by the managers.
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sold players. The reason for this is that new players can be “drafted” each Saturday after
an weekly update and often are immediately offered for sale, which explains the number of
deadlines expiring on Tuesdays and Wednesdays being accordingly higher. In our regres-
sions, we use dummies (mon-sun) to control for possible effects of the auction end day and
additionally also include a dummy (peakhour) to indicate whether a player was sold between
5:30 p.m. and 10 p.m., where the highest numbers of simultaneous online users are reached
and most auctions expire.19
Table 2 states the summary statistics of the most important variables in our sample. As
shown in Panel A, the mean reserve price (askprice) in our sample was e 77,537, but levels
as high as e 579,000 were reached.20 Note that the final prices fall into a comparable range,
indicating that by and large the reserve prices were not set beside the point. Since the age
of a player is displayed in the form “X years and Y days” on his profile-page, the variable
years defines his age-group and days discloses information on his precise age, or equivalently,
the distance to his next birthday. The constructed measure totalage ∈ [3, 335] displays the
total age of a player in day units and thus combines the information contained in both age
variables, where we normalize totalage ≡ 112·(years −17) + days, using the fact that a year
in HT is normalized to 112 days.21
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A. Panel B.
Variable Mean Min Max Variable Value Frequency Percent
askprice 77,537 0 579,000 age distribution (years = 17) 1,886 30.14
pricea 81,459 0 634,000 (years = 18) 1,935 30.92
years 18 17 19 (years = 19) 2,437 38.94
days 59 0 111
totalageb 181 3 335 fresh players (acquired = 0) 4,253 67.96
total skill index 1,994 650 3,240 purchased players (acquired = 1) 2,005 32.04
wage 1,884 770 2,676
form 6 1 8 reserve price (askprice > 0) 5,108 81.62
stamina 3 1 9 no reserve price (askprice = 0) 1,150 18.38
passing 1 1 4
playmaking 1 1 3 successful trades (price > 0) 4,743 75.79
scoring 1 1 3 players unsold (price = 0) 1,515 24.21
winger 1 1 4
setpieces 2 1 7 sold at reserve price (price=askprice) 756 15.94
defense 1 1 4 sold above reserve price (price>askprice) 3,987 84.06
a. A Price of zero indicates a failed auction. The minimum price among all successful trades was e 19,000.
b. The variable totalage = 112 · (years − 17) + days displays a players precise age in day units. The minimum value of
totalage at 3 reflects age “17 years and 3 days” and the maximum value at 335 equals “19 years and 111 days”.
Panel B provides some frequency statistics of our data. Note that all age-groups are roughly
equally represented, with a slight majority of players aged nineteen. According to our wage-
bonus proxy (indicated by the dummy acquired), in 32% of all auctions the sellers offered
19See Figure 9 in Appendix 6.
20All monetary values are denoted in units of virtual HT -Euros.
21Note that since each auction lasts for 3 days, totalage has its minimum at 3, or “17 years 3 days”. The
maximum value of totalage at 335 reflects the age “19 years 111 days”.
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players they previously bought themselves on the market. 68% of the times, a player pro-
moted from the own youth squad of the seller, i.e. a “fresh” player, was auctioned off. For
5,108 players in our sample the seller fixed a strictly positive reserve price. Surprisingly, this
fact already establishes that more than 18% of the sellers did not make use of the possibility
to set a reserve price.22 Of all players, 4,743 were sold and in 756 cases the trade took place
at a price equal to the minimum bid (single bidder case).
3 Analysis and Results
In light of the “birthday effect” on the demand side of HT ’s transfer market, which is
illustrated in Figure 3b analogously to Englmaier & Schmo¨ller (2009) for the present sample,
it seems a natural point to start our analysis of the driving forces in the formation of reserve
prices by examining their relation to a player’s age.
Figure 3: Relation of Reserve Prices and Sales Prices to Total Age
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Notes: The dashed lines at 112 and 224 mark the points where the players turn eighteen and nineteen, respectively.
Intuitively, the variable totalage captures all available information on the players’ age
attribute. As we argue above, and as implied by the nature of the game’s training algo-
rithm, the value of a player should ceteris paribus decline continuously as totalage increases.
This fact should also be reflected in the reserve prices.
However, Figure 3a already reveals that the relation between reserve price and total age is not
smooth but exhibits large discontinuities where the players enter the next higher age-group,
indicating that the birthday effect also persists for reserve prices. Since most managers in
HT alternate between both roles, it does not seem too surprising to find similar behavioral
22In line with Simonsohn et al. (2008), it is possible that these managers may want to maximize entry
and the number of bidders in the auction by not screening out any low-value bidders. As we will show in
Section 4, however, in terms of expected auction revenue they forego potential profits.
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patterns for buyers and sellers. At a first glance, it stands to reason that also the sellers are
inattentive to the finer information on the age attribute as conveyed through the days of
age. Another possibility is that the bias on the demand side actually triggers the observed
choice of reserve prices, and what we observe is the result of at least some sellers following
strategic considerations and trying to exploit the biased bidding behavior.
Even more intriguing, reserve prices appear to react even less sensitively to the precise age of
players than the sales prices. The pattern depicted in Figure 3a reveals substantial clusters
at 0 and at multiples of e 50,000. As we discuss in more detail below, this indicates that
reserve prices are too clustered as to be compatible with fully rational behavior, where the
optimal reserve price is a continuous function of the hazard rate of the distribution of buyers’
valuations (see e.g. Krishna, 2002). If that was the case, at any age the reserve prices should
be similarly dispersed as the final sales prices (see Figure 3b).
In the following, we analyze these indications in more detail. After a brief discussion of the
estimation model, we present the results from a hedonic regression analysis that allows us
to identify the determinants of the reserve price from the set of attributes and the auction
details in our data. In addition, we also examine possible interactions between the observed
demand and supply side behavior.
3.1 Estimation Model and Predictions
If a seller wants to maximize his expected revenue, his choice for the reserve price for a player
rationally requires him to form an estimate of the expected bidders valuations. Since both
parties, buyers and sellers, share the same information set on the players’ attributes when
pursuing their evaluation task, our intuition is that similar to the bidders’ valuations, also
the reserve price is a function of the various player attributes.
To put more structure on the estimation model, consider Figure 3a again. Note that the
observed discontinuities where the players turn one year older apparently differ in their
relative size. To account for this possibility, we decompose the variable years into dummies
for each age-group, which we label age17, age18, and age19. For example, the effect of age-
group eighteen is measured by age18 taking value 1 and 0 otherwise. Since these dummies
are perfectly correlated, we need to include only two of them in our estimation model. As
we drop age17 from the regression, the resulting coefficients for the included dummies are
to be interpreted as the difference in values upon entering an age-group relative to the price
of a player aged “17 years 0 days”. Moreover, we account for the impact of a marginal
day of age separately for each age-group by interacting the age-group dummies with days,
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which yields the variables days17, days18, and days19 ∈ [0, 111]. They display the days of
age conditional on belonging to the specified age-group and zero otherwise. Formally, this
corresponds to a piece-wise linear relationship between totalage and askprice.23 All other
regressors are assumed to enter linearly into the regression model, which is thus given by
askprice = α + βage18 · age18 + βage19 · age19 +
+ βday17 · days17 + βday18 · days18 + βday19 · days19 +
+ βtsi · tsi + βacquired · acquired + δX + u, (1)
where X represents the vector of all other attributes and auction details. With this specifica-
tion, we are able to identify and measure the average magnitude of potential discontinuities
in the reserve price pattern at the players’ birthdays. Intuitively, the coefficients for the
age-groups (βage18 and βage19) reflect the total value difference across two subsequent age-
groups, while the 112 times the respective impact of a marginal day (βday17, βday18, or βday19,
respectively) accounts for the aggregated value decline within an age-group. Only if both
measures imply the same average decline, the reserve prices evolve continuously in totalage.
Formally, this corresponds to the testable predictions stated in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 If the reserve price pattern exhibits the birthday effect, then
(i) the coefficient for age18 is larger than the aggregated value decline per day in age-group
seventeen, i.e
|βage18| > 112 · |βday17|,
(ii) the difference between the coefficients of age19 and age18 is larger than the aggregated
value decline per day in age-group eighteen, i.e
|βage19 − βage18| > 112 · |βday18|.
The model specification (1) also includes the dummy acquired to control for possible dif-
ferences between fresh players and those that have been traded previously. One might be
tempted to argue that this should have no effect on the buyers’ valuations and therefore
should play no role for the sellers’ considerations with respect to the reserve price.
However, whether or not a player was sold before conveys a subtle piece of potentially
valuable information. To see this, recall from the discussion of tsi in Section 2 that the
skill-levels contain hidden decimal places, while the profile page only shows the adjective
corresponding to the integer value for each skill. For example, consider a freshly promoted
player (acquired = 0 ) from a manager’s youth squad, who displays a keeping score of 6.
23This specification is adopted analogously from the earlier analysis of the demand side of HT ’s transfer
market and corresponds to the information given to us by the makers of HT. For a more detailed discussion
see Englmaier & Schmo¨ller (2009).
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Since skills are completely randomly assigned, his precise skill can take any value within the
real interval [6, 7]. If we suppose that his sub-skill is uniformly distributed on this interval,
a rational buyer would have a prior of 6.5 for the expected keeping-skill level.
In contrast to that, if a level-6 keeper was traded previously (acquired = 1 ), there is a positive
probability that he was trained in keeping and just reached the lower threshold of 6.00 to
display a score of 6. Recalling the “train-and-trade” strategy the majority of managers
pursues, from perspective of the seller this would be the rational time to offer the player for
sale. According to Bayes’ rule, a rational prospective buyer should adjust his prior of the
expected skill-level, and thus his value estimate for such a player, downwards accordingly.24
Since an optimal reserve price depends on the distribution of the bidder’s valuations, if
anything, this implies that the reserve prices should not be larger for purchased players
relative to fresh ones.
Hypothesis 2 If the sellers correctly anticipate the considerations of the buyers with respect
to a previous sale, the reserve prices for purchased players should not be larger than those
for fresh players, i.e.
βacquired ≤ 0.
3.2 Results
To test the validity of the above hypotheses, we start out with a series of hedonic OLS
regressions with the reserve price as the dependent variable, where we only consider obser-
vations where the managers set a reserve price different from zero.25 We either include only
the main variables of interest or the full set of controls. In addition, we run a separate
regression for experienced managers to see whether they behave differently than the average
manager, where we classify a seller as an expert, if his team is ranked among the top 20%
in his country (sellerxp < 0.2).26 Moreover, to identify whether the reserve prices follow a
similar pattern as the bidders valuations, we additionally run two regressions for the final
sales price as the dependent variable, where the first contains all successful trades and the
second only those, where the reserve price was set to zero. Table 3 presents the results.
24Since at present about 10% of the HT population trains keeping, the expected skill for level-6 keeper
accordingly reduces to 0.1 · 6.0 + 0.9 · 6.5 = 6.45 < 6.5
25All results remain qualitatively robust if we instead run a Tobit regression accounting for our sample
being left-censored at zero. Moreover, the same holds true if we consider log-linearized reserve price records
and control for influential outliers using a robust regression procedure. For the sake of brevity, here we omit
the regression tables but they are available from the authors upon request.
26Using sellerxp < 0.2 leaves us with a bit less than 30% of the observations from the subsample where
we were able to construct the experience dummy.
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Table 3: Determinants of Reserve Price and Final Price (OLS)
Reserve Price (Dep.Var.: askprice) Sales Price (Dep.Var.: price> 0)
I II III IV V
(Experts) (askprice = 0)
days17 -155.3∗∗ -166.94∗∗ -188.39 -1117.71∗∗∗ -1201.36∗∗∗
(70.62) (70.13) (179.36) (65.82) (151.61)
days18 -101.61∗∗∗ -99.53∗∗∗ -161.14 -166.95∗∗∗ -133.75∗∗∗
(37.67) (37.36) (104.12) (25.19) (41.51)
days19 -37.68 -33.89 -114.01 -30.38 -6.47
(27.48) (27.70) (84.85) (19.14) (31.16)
age18 -103154.72∗∗∗ -105770.16∗∗∗ -107809.34∗∗∗ -175188.98∗∗∗ -174963.87∗∗∗
(5648.10) (5650.93) (15232.99) (5114.74) (11906.80)
age19 -127305.85∗∗∗ -129555.76∗∗∗ -134111.3∗∗∗ -205895.9∗∗∗ -203476.81∗∗∗
(5342.31) (5466.74) (14944.07) (5064.23) (12023.98)
tsi 31.91∗∗∗ 28.41∗∗∗ 15.59 70.6∗∗∗ 62.83∗∗∗
(2.29) (4.73) (16.37) (3.93) (6.68)
acquired 26590.64∗∗∗ 17617.9∗∗∗ 23255.22∗∗ 1549.44 -7125.8
(1924.51) (2940.95) (10404.38) (2168.67) (4530.93)
Intercept 107024.18∗∗∗ 98755.29∗∗∗ 105784.1∗∗ 122811.82∗∗∗ 146496.82∗∗∗
(6537.69) (14783.43) (42967.33) (12407.64) (19927.25)
skills no yes yes yes yes
character no yes yes yes yes
daytime no yes yes yes yes
weekday no yes yes yes yes
R2 0.47 0.48 0.56 0.74 0.74
N 5108 5108 567 4743 1149
F 453.10 120.72 29.15 244.52 48.03
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1%(***), 5%(**)
or 10%(*) level. “Skills” captures the playing abilities except of keeping (= constant). “Character” contains all other player
attributes except tsi. “Daytime” and “weekday” indicate whether dummies for daytime and day of the week were included.
The birthday-effect. In any reserve price regression (columns I-III), the age of a player
has a highly significant negative impact on the level of the minimum bid set by the sellers.
Representatively focus on the full-control specification in column II. The coefficient of age18
indicates that the average reserve price for a player who just turned eighteen is substantially
lower (by e 105,770) than that for a player aged “17 years 0 days” at 99%-significant t-
statistics, which is not too surprising given the game’s training algorithm. However, holding
all other variables constant, a marginal day within the age-group seventeen just accounts
for a decline of e 167 in the average reserve price. Aggregated over the whole year (112
days), this gradual day-by-day decline explains only 18% (e 18,704) of the total value loss
measured on the eighteenth birthday of a player. More precisely, the remaining 82% of
the total decline establish an enormous discontinuity in the reserve price pattern where a
player turns eighteen, i.e. |βage18| ≫ 112 · |βdays17|. A Wald-test shows that this difference is
significant on the highest level (p-value: 0.000). Similarly, also at the nineteenth birthday of
a player we find a significant discontinuity of 53% of the total decline between the age-groups
eighteen and nineteen, and thus |βage19 − βage18| ≫ 112 · |βdays18|.
In the regression for experienced sellers (column III), observe that the impact of a marginal
day is qualitatively similar but no longer significant, which may be due to the reduced number
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of observations (N=567). Note that this implies that the reserve prices do not adjust to age
within but only across age-groups, making our result even stronger. If we account for the
aggregate day effects despite their insignificance, we find a discontinuity of 80% and 31% at
the eighteenth and nineteenth birthday, respectively. The results from the regression analysis
are thus consistent with the prediction from Hypothesis 1 that the reserve price pattern picks
up the birthday effect, which establishes our first result.
Result 1 (The birthday effect): Similar to the sales prices, the reserve price pattern
does not evolve continuously in the total age of a player. Instead, it picks up the birthday
effect in form of substantial and highly significant discontinuities at the players’ birthdays.
Reserve price and bidder valuation. Observe further that adding the full set of controls
to the regression (column II) only slightly improves the predictive power of the estimation
model relative to column I, implying that the age variables, tsi, and acquired are indeed the
most influential factors for the choice of the reserve price.27 Moreover, except for acquired,
all coefficients in the reserve price regressions qualitatively mirror those for the sales prices
in columns IV and V.28 This is in line with the prediction that sellers take into account the
bidders’ valuations when forming their reserve price.
To distinguish whether the supply side reacts to the demand side behavior or vice versa,
in column V we only consider the sales prices from auctions where the seller set no reserve
price (askprice = 0). If the birthday effect persists also for this subsample, we can rule out
that the latter originates from the supply side of the transfer market. As it turns out, this
is indeed the case. We find clear evidence for a birthday effect in the sales prices in column
V, amounting to highly significant discontinuities of 23% and 47% of the total decline at
the eighteenth and nineteenth birthday, respectively.29 Since the bidding pattern is thus
qualitatively unaltered in absence of a positive reserve price, this implies that the sellers
take into account the expected bidders’ valuations when making their reserve price choice,
yielding our second result.
Result 2 (Reserve prices relate to bidder valuations): The reserve prices are shaped
remarkably similar to the final prices and share the same subset of influential player
27While each group of controls turns out to be jointly significant, all effects of individually significant
control variables are of secondary order and do not conflict with any of our results. To ease the exposition,
we therefore omit a detailed discussion. The full regression tables can be requested from the authors.
28Note however that the relevant coefficients in the price regressions are quantitatively much larger as in
those for the reserve price and the latter does not react as nuancedly to the precise age. As we will discuss
below, this likely is due to the strong clustering of the reserve prices.
29The discontinuities for the full sample of non-zero sales prices can be readily calculated from column
IV in Table 3 and are given by 29% (
βage18−112·βday17
βage18
) and 39% (
βage19−βage18−112·βday18
βage19−βage18
), respectively.
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attributes. The finding of a birthday effect for the supply side is consistent with the sell-
ers relating their choice of the reserve price to the bidders’ valuations.
Reserve price and auction outcome. Before we go on with our analysis of seller be-
havior, we briefly consider the predicted effects of a reserve price on the final price on a more
general level. Relative to a zero minimum bid, one of the most basic general predictions is
that higher reserve prices should reduce the likelihood of a successful sale, because low-value
bidders will cease to participate (Reiley, 2006). Since all but one of the 24% failed auctions
in our sample exhibited a strictly positive minimum bid, this prediction is clearly met.30 A
non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) ranksum test confirms that the askprices
for unsold players are significantly higher than those for successful trades (p-value: 0.000).
We also find that the expected final price unconditional on a successful sale is lower if the
reserve price is above zero (p-value: 0.000).
Evidence for sophisticated seller behavior. Conditional on a successful sale, however,
the expected price is larger for positive askprices (p-value: 0.000). Intuitively, if the seller
manages to set a reserve price between the highest bidder’s and the second highest bidder’s
valuation, the auction price is mechanically higher than if there was no minimum bid and
the seller successfully reaps some of the winner’s surplus.31 Since in 15.9% of the successful
trades there was only a single bidder and the winning bid equaled the reserve price (Panel B
of Table 2), we take it that the sellers in these 756 auctions were successful in their attempt
to appropriate some of the highest bidder’s surplus.
Figure 4: Distribution of Sold and Unsold Players and Median Reserve Prices
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Notes: The dashed lines at 112 and 224 mark the points where the players turn eighteen and nineteen, respectively.
30Since the sample was hand-collected, this one observation may be due to a data-entry error.
31See also Trautmann and Traxler (2008), who - also in HT data - distinguish between this mechanical
effect of “surplus appropriation” and a potential psychological channel of influence of the reserve price on
the final price, as suggested in Rosenkranz & Schmitz (2007).
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A natural next step is to ask whether at least some sellers react strategically in anticipation
of the biased bidding behavior on the demand side of the transfer market. We would expect
that sellers who are aware of the “birthday effect” should rationally try to sell players that are
close to turn one year older, thereby avoiding to bear the accompanying value loss themselves.
Consistent with this intuition, the distribution for sold and unsold players shown in Figure
4a clearly indicates an increased number of sale offers shortly before players turn eighteen.
At about 90 days of total age, both the total number of offers and the number of failed
auctions increase substantially, while the number of sales (and also the selling price pattern)
remains largely constant. At the same time, the median askprice exhibits a local peak at
exactly the same age level (Figure 4b). Though considerably less pronounced, we observe an
similar increase around three weeks before the nineteenth and also the twentieth birthday.
Our intuition is that the sellers set rather high reserve prices at that stage in the hope to
find a buyer who is not aware of the birthday effect and is thus willing to pay the asked
price. Clearly, the downside of this strategy is that the probability for a successful sale
is considerably reduced. This would also explain the higher number of failed auctions we
observe. In even closer proximity to a player’s birthday, however, a seller should rationally
change his strategy and try to maximize the probability for a successful sale by charging a
rather low minimum bid.
Figure 5: Reserve Prices in Close Proximity to Discontinuity Point
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Notes: The figure includes 756 (883) observations of players 3 weeks before and after their eighteenth (nineteenth) birthday.
Figure 5 plots the reserve prices closely before and after the eighteenth (nineteenth) birthday
of the players in our sample. Consistent with our intuition, observe that the median reserve
price for seventeen year old players begins to decline at 110 days of total age and drops
to zero at 112, while it moves upwards again immediately after the birthday. A similar
effect exists for the nineteenth birthday, though the drop is not as emphasized and takes
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place a few days before the birthday.32 Though merely inferred by inspection, we take these
observations as an indication that at least some sellers behave strategically.
Result 3 (Strategic seller behavior): At least some sellers show sophisticated strategic
considerations in their choice of the reserve price, as indicated by an increased number of sale
offers and low minimum bids in close proximity to the birthdays. Moreover, a substantial
fraction of sellers manages to extract additional rents from the winning bidder by setting a
reserve price above the second highest bidder’s valuation.
The impact of a previous sale. Next, we consider the impact on the reserve price if a
player was previously traded. Returning to Table 3, we find strong evidence that sellers set
significantly higher minimum bids for players they acquired on the market (acquired = 1)
relative to fresh players from their own youth squads (acquired = 0). Throughout all reserve
price specifications (columns I-III), contrasting with Hypothesis 2 the coefficient βacquired is
positive, large, and significant on the highest level, implying a strong positive correlation of
acquired with askprice. Holding all other variables constant, the average reserve price for
purchased players in column II exceeds that for fresh players by an amount of e 17,618, or
23% of the mean reserve price. To illustrate the economic significance of this effect, note
that the statistically weighted average impact of tsi, which we obtain by multiplying its
coefficient (βtsi = 28.4) times one standard deviation of the average tsi -score (σtsi = 428),
only amounts to e 12,155, i.e. about two-thirds of the coefficient for the dummy acquired.
In contrast to that, the regression for price conditional on sale in (column IV) yields an
insignificant coefficient for acquired, all else equal implying that the buyers’ valuations do not
significantly differ whether or not a seller was traded before. Furthermore, in the specification
for auction prices with a zero reserve price (column V), the coefficient for acquired is sizeable
and has a negative sign, i.e. qualitatively the effect goes into the opposite direction for
buyers. Though not statistically significant, this points towards the latter on average having
a higher willingness to pay for fresh players, which is consistent with our above reasoning
that a previous sale rationally translates into a lower expected (sub-) skill-level.33
An immediate implication of these results is that auctions for purchased players are ceteris
paribus more likely to fail. Among the players that were bought (acquired = 1), the share of
failed auctions was 32.6%, which is substantially higher than that for fresh players at 20.3%.
32However, note that the absolute impact of the birthday effect is considerably lower at age nineteen,
which might explain the reduced reaction of the sellers at this point.
33Table 8 in Appendix 6 shows the results from an additional Tobit regression, where we include also
the failed auctions with a zero sales price, i.e. with the sales price unconditional on entry as the dependent
variable. In this approach, acquired has a highly significant negative coefficient (βtobitacquired = −13, 579) which
accounts for roughly 17% of the unconditional mean price. Unconditional on a successful sale, the average
sales price is thus considerably lower for previously traded players.
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A Pearson’s chi-square test confirms that there is a statistically significant relationship be-
tween acquired and the frequency of players remaining unsold (p-value: 0.000). Moreover,
if a player was previously traded, we find that in only 9.9% of the cases the reserve price
was set to zero. Among fresh players with 22.4% this share is more than twice as large. To
further substantiate this finding, we estimate the likelihood for a positive reserve price in a
series of Logit regressions on the dummy d ask, which takes the values 1 or 0 depending on
whether or not there was a positive minimum bid. The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Likelihood of Non-Zero Reserve Price
Logit I Logit II Logit III
expert sellers
Dep.Var.: d ask Odds Rt. Marg. Efct. Odds Rt. Marg. Efct. Odds Rt. Marg. Efct.
days17 1.0032 0.0005 1.0029 0.0004 0.9969 -0.0005
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0059)
days18 0.9980 -0.0003 0.9976 -0.0003 0.9991 -0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0047)
days19 0.9983 -0.0002 0.9980 -0.0003 0.9978 -0.0004
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0044)
age18 0.8622 -0.0211 0.8516 -0.0223 0.4291 -0.1368
(0.1726) (0.1727) (0.2232)
age19 0.7563 -0.0397 0.7673 -0.0368 0.4271 -0.1376
(0.1434) (0.1495) (0.2231)
tsi 0.9999∗ 0.0000 0.9998 0.0000 1.0007 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006)
acquired 2.4449∗∗∗ 0.1270 1.8536∗∗∗ 0.0857 4.7540∗∗∗ 0.2521
(0.2101) (0.227) (2.2669)
skills no yes yes
character no yes yes
daytime no yes yes
weekday no yes yes
LR Chi 212.93 306.42 95.04
N 6258 6258 748
Notes: The Logit procedure estimates the impact of the independent variables on the probability to observe “d ask
= 1” relative to “d ask = 0”. For each specification, the left (right) column states the odds ratio (marginal effect) for
the respective regressor variable. Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance
at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Sellers are classified as experts if sellerxp<0.2.
The first two columns (Logit I) show the odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) and the
corresponding marginal effects (instantaneous change) in the probability when only the main
variables are used as regressors. Note that acquired is the only variable which has a highly
significant impact. For a purchased player, the odds for a strictly positive reserve price
(versus a zero reserve price) increases by a highly significant factor of 2.4 as compared to a
player that was internally promoted from a seller’s own youth squad. In terms of the marginal
effect, a non-zero reserve price is 12.7% more likely for previously acquired players.34 If we
employ the full vector of player attributes and auction details as controls (Logit II), all
results remain qualitatively robust. In line with our previous results, the same holds true in
34The marginal change equals the partial derivative of the predicted probability with respect to the
respective regressor variable.
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the separate regression for expert sellers (Logit III). If anything, the effect seems to be even
more pronounced for experts.
Hence, if a player was bought rather than promoted internally by the seller, not only the level
of the reserve price is higher on average, but also the likelihood that it is set different from
zero at all. Stated differently, even though the managers interact in a highly competitive
market environment, our findings indicate that the sellers in HT exhibit some form of sunk
cost fallacy resulting in an entitlement effect with respect to players that they acquired on
the market, but not for those promoted from their own youth squad.
Result 4 (Entitlement effect for acquired players): Relative to internally promoted
players, the average seller in HT demands a positive reserve price premium for players they
previously acquired on the market (βacquired > 0). Hypothesis 2 can thus be rejected.
This finding suggests that the sellers of purchased players fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy
and loss aversion. For instance, a seller might be tempted to regard his own acquisition cost
as a benchmark for the reserve price he sets and thus charges at least the same amount,
or feels even entitled to demand an additional premium. Yet, this cost is sunk and should
rationally not affect his choice. Moreover, since his valuation was the highest in the previous
auction, this might be too high a threshold, if a player hasn’t significantly increased in quality
in the meantime. In contrast, for internally promoted players there is no such benchmark,
which would explain the difference in reserve prices that we observe.
Reserve price clustering. While we find final and reserve prices to respond very
differently if a player has been traded previously, we already pointed out that the impact
of all other influential variables is qualitatively similar for both. However, all coefficients
for the age variables and also for tsi are quantitatively much larger in the price regressions
than in those for the reserve price. For instance, in column IV of Table 3, holding all other
variables constant, a marginal day in age-group seventeen reduces the sales price on aver-
age by e 1,118, while the analogous effect for the reserve price is only e 167, or 15% of
the former. Intuitively, the minimum bids react substantially less sensitively to the precise
age. A possible explanation for this pattern arises from the fact that the reserve prices are
remarkably clustered around focal points at multiples of e 50,000, as indicated in Figure 3a
above. This intuition is further strengthened by an inspection of the frequency distribution
of (non-zero) reserve prices in our sample as depicted in Figure 6.
First, consider the four histograms on the left of Figure 6 which depicts the frequency
distribution of (non-zero) reserve prices for the full sample and for each age-group separately.
Though they naturally exhibit some variation, we find that reserve prices are substantially
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Figure 6: Distribution of Reserve Prices and their Fourth-to-last Digits
clustered at multiples of e 50,000. The distribution for the full sample exhibits several
distinct spikes ranging from e 50,000 to e 300,000. A similar pattern arises on the individual
age-group levels, where the effect is most accentuated for seventeen year old players. In
particular, their reserve prices are most frequently set to the (round) values of e 100,000,
e 150,000, and e 200,000. The patterns for ages eighteen and nineteen also exhibit strong
focal points at e 50,000 and at some of its multiples, though less pronounced due to the
age-induced decline in the players’ values.
Second, we also find evidence for considerable lower scale clustering. On the right of Figure
6 we plot the frequency distribution of the fourth-to-last digit (the “thousands”-digit) of the
reserve prices. For example, if the reserve price is given by e 67,000 the digit takes value
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“7”. Accordingly, the spikes at the values of 0, 5, and 9 indicate that a majority of reserve
prices were set at multiples of e 5,000, or just below the next full ten-thousand.
Result 5 (Clustering at round numbers): The distribution of reserve prices exhibits
substantial clusters at multiples of e 50,000, and also on a lower scale at multiples of e 5,000.
According to Sonnemans (2006), such (large scale) round number-clustering could be caused
by boundedly rational sellers, who form mental target prices, which then serve as a “good
enough”-solution in their view instead of considering the precise distribution of bidders’
valuations. In line with this intuition, and also with the findings documented in Benartzi
and Thaler (2008) for the determination of savings choices, we interpret the strong cluster-
ing in the reserve price pattern as evidence for sellers using a round number heuristic, or
rule-of-thumb, when making their choice for a reserve price to considerably simplify their
decision making.
Moreover, recall that a large fraction of the sellers (18%) sets a reserve price of zero. Both the
strong clustering and frequent absence of a positive minimum bid stand in marked contrast
to the theoretical predictions for the optimal reserve price in an IPV context. This suggests
that many sellers do not efficiently utilize the reserve price as an instrument to maximize
their expected revenue. Intuitively, an efficient strategy to appropriate a share of the winning
bidder’s rent would require a seller to form fine-tuned estimates of the expected (second)
highest-order statistic derived from the distribution of valuations rather than to employ a
simplifying rule-of-thumb. Moreover, due to the large scale clustering a substantial fraction
of reserve prices are set considerably below and above the optimal level. In the latter case,
an excessive number of auctions will fail resulting in an inefficient allocation.
4 Optimal Reserve Price and Foregone Revenue
In this section we quantify the economic consequences of suboptimal reserve prices by provid-
ing estimates of how much expected revenue is effectively lost as compared to the situation
with optimal reserve prices. In doing so, we account for the effect of age on the players’
values, and thus on the level of the optimal reserve price, by subdividing our sample into
weekly intervals of precise age, yielding a total of 48 “cohorts”. Each age-group consists
of 16 cohorts, where the intervals are defined such that they only contain players from the
same age-group.35 Abstracting from the small variation of the precise age, we assume that
the values for the players within cohort j are realizations from the same underlying value
35For example, cohort 16 includes all players in the interval totalage ∈ [105, 111] (i.e. “17 years 105 days”
to ”17 years 111 days”), while cohort 17 contains those with totalage ∈ [112, 118] (i.e. “18 years 0 days” to
“18 years 6 days”). Hence, the birthday effect will take place across but not within the cohorts.
25
distribution function, Fj(v). Under this assumption, the optimal reserve price, r
∗
j , is the
same for all players belonging to cohort j.
In the following, we start with a brief description of our approach to determine the optimal
reserve price.36 In particular, we first use the information on the observed sales prices in
our data to identify a non-parametric estimate for the valuation primitive of each cohort.
By using a Maximum Likelihood method (MLE) to obtain a parametric distribution best
describing these point estimates, we then determine the optimal reserve prices and the max-
imum expected revenues. Subsequently, we present the results from comparing the expected
revenues at the actual reserve prices to the corresponding optimal benchmark.
4.1 Estimation of the Optimal Reserve Price
As a first step to estimate the optimal reserve price it proves useful to re-consider the seller’s
problem in general. In particular, the expected revenue of a seller who sets a reserve price
of r for an object for sale is given by
Π(r) = v0F (r)
N + rN(1− F (r))F (r)N−1 +
v∫
r
u(1− F (u))(N − 1)F (r)N−2f(u)du, (2)
where 0 ≤ v0 ≤ r is the reservation value of the seller and N the number of potential bidders.
Under the independent private value (IPV) assumptions, the bidders’ individual valuations
are i.i.d. draws from the increasing distribution function F (v), the “valuation primitive”,
which has support [0, v] and admits a continuous density function f(v) ≡ F ′(v) (see e.g.
Krishna, 2002). The first term on the RHS of (2) thus captures the expected utility from the
event that none of the N potential buyers realizes a valuation above r and the seller gets v0,
which occurs with probability F (r)N . The second term reflects the event where all but one
bidder have a lower valuation than r, which occurs with probability N(1− Fj(r))Fj(r)
N−1.
In that case, the winning bid equals r and the seller successfully manages to reap some
of the winner’s surplus. Finally, the third term states the expected sales price conditional
on more than one bidder having a valuation of at least r. The choice for the reserve price
thus involves a trade off between a higher probability that the auction fails and realizing
additional gains from a sales price above the second-highest bidder’s valuation.
36For the sake of brevity, we omit the details of the calculus, which was performed with Matlab and
follows the algorithm laid out in Paarsch & Hong (2006). The corresponding m-files can be requested from
the authors. All proofs for the validity of the applied approach are available in standard textbooks, e.g.
Paarsch & Hong (2006) and Krishna (2002).
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As a general result under IPV, for any arbitrary value distribution function F (v), the optimal
reserve price r∗ that maximizes (2) is independent of the number of potential bidders and
given by
r∗ = v0 +
1
µ(r∗)
, (3)
where µ(v) ≡ 1−F (v)
f(v)
is the hazard rate of F (v) (see Riley & Samuleson, 1981). Thus, the
optimal reserve price r∗ will always lie above v0 and depends on the valuation primitive of
the bidders, which is unknown the econometrician.
However, F (v) is non-parametrically identified from the winning bids, i.e. the observed sales
prices (Athey & Haile, 2002). Depending on the auction format, the latter describe the
empirical distribution of the ith order statistic from an i.i.d. sample of size N from the
valuation primitive F (v). Since the auction format in HT is strategically equivalent to
a sealed-bid-second-price auction, the winning bid equals the second-highest bid plus one
discrete increment, whenever the reserve price was set below the second highest bidder’s
valuation.37
Denote by wjk the observed sales price of auction k = 1, ..., Kj in cohort j. Hence, the
Kj sales prices observed for cohort j describe an empirical distribution function Fˆj(wjk),
38
which is equivalent to the distribution of the second-highest order statistic of the valuation
primitive, i.e. the distribution of the second-highest valuations F(2)j(v,Njk):
Fˆj(wjk) ≡ F(2)j(v; Njk) = Njk · Fj(v)
Njk−1 − (Njk − 1) · Fj(v)
Njk , (4)
where Njk is the number of potential bidders in auction k in cohort j. Though the reserve
price is independent of Njk, it enters the distribution of the second-highest order statistic,
which in the following is used to identify the valuation primitive Fj(v). However, we have
no information on how many potential bidders will view a particular player. At this point,
we therefore need to make a simplifying assumption on the value of Njk used to obtain the
estimate of Fj(v).
Assumption 1 (Potential number of bidders): The number of potential bidders is
exogenously fixed and identical for all auctions in the sample: Njk = N ∀ j, k.
In addition, we borrow on the dataset of 17,510 HT -auctions from the study of the demand
side in Englmaier & Schmo¨ller (2009) to determine appropriate values for N to be used in
the estimation. Conveniently, their data contain information on the number of bids placed
37In a sealed-bid second price auction, the equilibrium bidding strategy is to place a bid equal to one’s
own valuation, vi, while in the English ascending open bid auction a bidder will repeatedly increase his bid
until the current price reaches vi and exit thereafter.
38Given a vector of length T , an empirical distribution function is a cumulative probability distribution
function that concentrates a probability of 1/T at each of the T elements in the vector.
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in each auction.39 We argue that this is a reasonable proxy for the potential number of
bidders viewing an individual player on the transfer market. In particular, we obtain the
point estimates of Fj(v) for N = 7, which is equal to the median number of bids in these
data.40
By substituting N = 7 and the values for Fˆj(wjk) into (4), we are able to obtain point
estimates of the valuation primitive for each of the 48 cohorts by numerically solving for the
roots with respect to Fj(v). As the results are qualitatively similar for all j, Figure 7 shows
the results from this approach for a representative cohort in the middle of each age-group.
Figure 7: Distribution Functions of First- and Second-Highest Order Statistic and ML-Estimator
The figure depicts the empirical distribution Fˆj(wjk) of the winning bids and the correspon-
ding point estimates of the valuation primitive Fj(v) for cohorts j = {9, 25, 41}. For every j,
Fˆj(wjk) resembles the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a normal distribution, and
Fj(v) is approximately exponentially distributed. Assuming the valuation primitive indeed
follows an exponential distribution, we have that
Fj(v)
MLE
−→ F˜j(v; λj) = 1− e
−λjv ∀ v ∈ R+0 (5)
where λj is the Maximum-Likelihood estimator (MLE) for the rate parameter of the expo-
nential distribution F˜j(v; λj) best describing Fj(v), which is also depicted in Figure 7.
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Having derived an estimator for the underlying valuation primitive Fj(v) for the players
in cohort j, we are able to determine the corresponding optimal reserve price r∗j up to a
constant, i.e. the reservation value v0 of the seller. However, v0 is not observed and thus
39For a graphical illustration of the distribution of the number of bids see Figure 12 in Appendix 6.
40To account for the effect of the number of potential bidders we repeated the estimation for N = 13
(mean number of bids), N = 2 (25th-percentile), and N = 18 (75th-percentile). For a discussion of the
results see Section 4.2 below. All tables are available from the authors upon request.
41Given the exponential formulation and k observations in cohort j, the log-likelihood function used to
estimate λj depends on the density of the second-highest-order statistic, f˜(2)j(v, λj), and is given by
ℓ(λj) =
∑
k
ln(f˜(2)j(v, λj)) =
∑
k
[
ln
(
N(N − 1)
)
+ ln
(
1− F˜j(v, λj)
)
+ (N − 2)ln
(
F˜j(v, λj)
)
+ ln
(
f˜j(v, λj)
)]
.
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unknown. Therefore, the estimation results for the optimal reserve prices additionally rely
on the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 2 (Reservation Values): The reservation value v0 is constant across all
sellers and given by the consumption value (CV ) of the players in the sample.
In particular, the fact that a player is offered for sale implicitly signals that his current
owner does not consider him as a suitable trainee for his current training-strategy. Given
this rationale, our belief is that it is plausible to assume that the value he attaches to the
player is likely to reflect the latter’s CV. As a proxy for the CV of the players in our sample,
we take about 80% of the average sales price (e 48,921) observed for the oldest players, i.e.
cohort 48, yielding an assumed value of v0 = 40, 000 for the reservation value of the sellers.
42
Table 5 shows the resulting estimates of the optimal reserve price for each cohort, which
are obtained by substituting v0 and F˜j(v; λj) into (3). In addition, we state the number of
observed winning bids, on which the identification of F˜j(v; λj) is based. Except for cohorts
j = 1 and j = 2, the youngest players in the sample, all estimates are based on more than 70
observations, yielding reasonably precise descriptions of the underlying valuation primitives.
Table 5: Optimal and Actual Reserve Prices by Cohort
Age 17 Age 18 Age 19
j Kj r
∗
j r
med
j r
mean
j j Kj r
∗
j r
med
j r
mean
j j Kj r
∗
j r
med
j r
mean
j
1 23 241,112 150,000 135,000 17 73 109,036 61,250 68,395 33 124 82,590 40,000 45,727
2 26 229,899 150,000 151,845 18 92 96,575 55,000 66,860 34 131 80,877 40,000 39,464
3 73 198,265 150,000 154,250 19 84 96,970 60,000 60,121 35 122 77,021 35,000 39,257
4 102 189,391 150,000 150,026 20 99 92,687 50,000 50,188 36 119 80,142 39,500 38,888
5 90 178,115 150,000 146,889 21 93 96,593 50,000 50,333 37 105 77,077 35,000 38,167
6 76 177,689 150,000 152,053 22 91 92,133 50,000 60,841 38 100 78,665 35,000 36,332
7 102 171,840 150,000 138,127 23 102 91,521 50,000 52,082 39 112 81,601 39,000 34,705
8 108 165,431 150,000 141,765 24 109 101,381 50,000 62,222 40 110 79,073 37,500 37,782
9 91 161,678 150,000 145,988 25 89 90,902 50,000 52,565 41 137 82,155 39,001 39,956
10 105 158,699 150,000 145,404 26 95 93,371 50,000 55,163 42 120 78,161 35,000 43,281
11 80 152,832 150,000 145,500 27 77 88,999 50,000 54,450 43 113 79,655 40,000 38,767
12 87 153,830 175,000 162,195 28 73 88,684 50,000 53,206 44 132 76,097 37,500 39,126
13 87 148,599 150,000 159,118 29 83 91,992 52,500 58,544 45 146 78,623 35,000 41,171
14 84 151,867 150,000 157,731 30 105 88,497 50,000 47,912 46 139 78,166 35,000 34,869
15 87 147,818 150,000 145,702 31 106 88,257 50,000 56,641 47 109 76,930 40,000 37,731
16 87 133,922 139,001 130,970 32 101 85,944 49,000 50,404 48 137 78,602 35,000 37,961
As we would expect, an inspection of the stated values for r∗j shows a clear tendency of
the level of the optimal reserve price to decline as age increases. Note that the estimates
42While the age-dependent APV will be very small for players at the end of age-group nineteen, Englmaier
& Schmo¨ller (2009) still find evidence for a small birthday effect at the age of twenty. Therefore, we adjust
our estimate of the CV downward to the value of e 40,000. All results remain robust, if we instead employ
the average sales price of the oldest players in age-group nineteen as a proxy for v0.
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for Fj(v), from which the respective values for r
∗
j are calculated, are solely based on the
observed sales prices in cohort j, which may be subject to considerable variation. Considering
this fact, it is not surprising that the decline is not strictly monotonic across all cohorts.
Importantly, however, observe that the estimated optimal reserve price exceeds the median
(rmedj ) and mean (r
mean
j ) of the observed minimum bids for almost all cohorts, and often
quite substantially.
4.2 Expected Revenue at Optimal and Actual Reserve Prices
In Section 3 we have shown that a substantial fraction of sellers sets either no reserve price
or uses a round-number heuristic to simplify their decision making. For example, note that
22 (17%) of the 130 sellers in cohort j = 9 set a reserve price of zero, 17 (13%) opted for a
value of e 150,000, 11 (8%) chose e 200,000, and the values of e 100,000 and e 250,000 were
each observed in 6 (5%) auctions, all together accounting for about half of the sellers. The
patterns for the other cohorts are quite similar. Therefore, we are particularly interested
how the expected revenues for these sellers compare to the estimated optimum.
Given the approximated valuation primitive F˜j(v; λj), analogously to (2) the expected revenue
at a reserve price of rj for a player from cohort j is given by
Π˜(rj) = v0F˜j(r)
N + rN(1− F˜j(r))F˜j(r)
N−1 +
v∫
rj
u(1− F˜j(u))(N − 1)F˜j(u)
N−2f˜j(u)du, (6)
where we denote F˜j(v) ≡ F˜j(v; λj) to simplify the notation. For the values of N and v0
assumed above, the maximum expected revenue for each cohort is given by substituting r∗j
into (6), where we additionally employ the 99th-percentile of the observed sales price in each
cohort as a proxy for v. Similarly, we are able to determine the expected revenue for any
reserve price observed in our sample. By comparing the resulting outcomes to the respective
optimum, we are thus able to determine the shares of expected revenue lost due to deviations
from the optimal reserve price.
Table 6 states results for age-group seventeen at several preeminent points of the actual
reserve price pattern, including zero and the main cluster points as indicated in Figure 6.43
To simplify the notation, we refer to a cluster point by Cx, where x indicates its respective
magnitude.
At a first glance, the deviations from the optimum appear to be small. The expected revenues
at the mean and median of the actual reserve prices (columns II and III) are remarkably close
43The corresponding results for age-groups eighteen and nineteen are qualitatively similar as shown in
Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix 6.
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Table 6: Expected Revenues for Age-Group 17 (Cohorts 1-16)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Coh. Obs. Π˜(r∗j ) Π˜(r
mean
j ) Π˜(r
med
j ) Π˜(0) Π˜(C50) Π˜(C100) Π˜(C200) Π˜(C250)
1 24 263,433 260,425 260,858 259,570 259,575 259,791 262,635 263,383
(-1.1%) (-1.0%) (-1.5%) (-1.5%) (-1.4%) (-0.3%) (-0.0%)
2 29 264,041 261,800 261,734 260,208 260,215 260,488 263,552 263,747
(-0.8%) (-0.9%) (-1.5%) (-1.4%) (-1.3%) (-0.2%) (-0.1%)
3 89 236,296 235,121 234,937 232,506 232,523 233,071 236,293 233,470
(-0.5%) (-0.6%) (-1.6%) (-1.6%) (-1.4%) (-0.0%) (-1.2%)
4 127 225,672 224,625 224,623 221,878 221,900 222,573 225,563 221,372
(-0.5%) (-0.5%) (-1.7%) (-1.7%) (-1.4%) (-0.0%) (-1.9%)
5 104 213,323 212,543 212,673 209,507 209,539 210,419 212,779 206,451
(-0.4%) (-0.3%) (-1.8%) (-1.8%) (-1.4%) (-0.3%) (-3.2%)
6 97 197,134 196,581 196,499 193,318 193,350 194,239 196,565 190,148
(-0.3%) (-0.3%) (-1.9%) (-1.9%) (-1.5%) (-0.3%) (-3.5%)
7 131 207,082 206,140 206,643 203,246 203,286 204,309 206,095 198,386
(-0.5%) (-0.2%) (-1.9%) (-1.8%) (-1.3%) (-0.5%) (-4.2%)
8 139 194,449 193,908 194,203 190,583 190,634 191,829 192,816 183,568
(-0.3%) (-0.1%) (-2.0%) (-2.0%) (-1.3%) (-0.8%) (-5.6%)
9 130 195,223 194,958 195,072 191,336 191,394 192,704 193,105 182,905
(-0.1%) (-0.1%) (-2.0%) (-2.0%) (-1.3%) (-1.1%) (-6.3%)
10 142 186,261 186,061 186,173 182,354 182,420 183,828 183,696 172,719
(-0.1%) (-0.0%) (-2.1%) (-2.1%) (-1.3%) (-1.4%) (-7.3%)
11 134 172,300 172,232 172,290 168,347 168,430 170,054 168,669 156,131
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.3%) (-2.2%) (-1.3%) (-2.1%) (-9.4%)
12 155 181,025 180,928 180,363 177,081 177,160 178,746 177,593 165,323
(-0.1%) (-0.4%) (-2.2%) (-2.1%) (-1.3%) (-1.9%) (-8.7%)
13 164 170,543 170,377 170,540 166,549 166,648 168,448 165,977 152,311
(-0.1%) (-0.0%) (-2.3%) (-2.3%) (-1.2%) (-2.7%) (-10.%)
14 147 177,945 177,897 177,940 173,983 174,069 175,732 174,113 161,318
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.2%) (-2.2%) (-1.2%) (-2.2%) (-9.3%)
15 140 172,311 172,304 172,304 168,308 168,410 170,245 167,555 153,684
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.3%) (-2.3%) (-1.2%) (-2.8%) (-10.%)
16 131 149,788 149,774 149,743 145,594 145,781 148,326 140,746 123,583
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.8%) (-2.7%) (-1.0%) (-6.0%) (-17.%)
Notes: Deviations from the maximum expected revenue are stated in parentheses. Since largely identical to the respective
median reserve price (see Table 5), the results for cluster point C150 are omitted from the presentation.
to Π˜(r∗j ). If we consider the sellers who abstain from setting a positive reserve price (column
IV), we find that they only lose a share of about 2% relative to the optimum. Moreover,
also the deviations at the cluster points C50 and C100 (columns V and VI) are of similar
magnitude. Returning to Table 5, note that all of these values are located considerably
below r∗j for j ∈ {1, ..., 16}. As a consequence, at these levels the reserve price is likely to
be non-binding in the sense that the odds for at least two of the assumed N = 7 potential
bidders realizing a higher valuation are reasonably large. Intuitively, these sellers forego the
chance to gain additional rents from setting a reserve price that lies above the expected
second-highest bidder’s valuation. The auction outcome is thus effectively determined by
the degree of competition among the potential bidders.
A higher number of potential bidders implies a larger number of i.i.d. draws from the val-
uation primitive. Since this ceteris paribus increases the probability for the realization of
high valuations, competition is more intense for higher N . Consistently, in the estimation
for N = 13 and N = 18 the shares of expected revenue lost relative to the optimum are of
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even smaller magnitude than for N = 7. Conversely, for N = 2 potential bidders also the
expected revenues at zero, C50, and C100 dramatically deviate from the optimum, since the
compensating impact of bidder competition is substantially reduced. Since HT ’s transfer
market is highly competitive, our intuition is that the assumption of at least N = 7 potential
bidders is indeed justified and that the finding of a relatively small loss in expected revenue
due to a suboptimally low reserve price adequately describes the actual situation.
As soon as the minimum bid exceeds the optimal reserve price, however, the shares of
foregone expected revenue increase substantially. Intuitively, an exaggerated minimum bid
induces an inefficiently high probability that the auction fails, which causes the expected
revenues for the seller to decline. For instance, the optimal reserve price in cohort j = 9 is
given by r∗9 = 161, 678. Yet, 15% of the sellers charged an reserve price equal to or above
C250, thereby accruing a loss of more than 6.3% relative to the optimum. Moreover, the
more the chosen minimum bid exceeds r∗j , the larger is the share of expected revenue lost.
In cohort j = 16, in 10% of the 131 auctions the seller demanded a starting price of C250 or
higher, thereby reducing his expected revenue by more than 17% relative to the optimum.
Figure 8 illustrates the respective deviations for all 16 cohorts in age-group seventeen.44
Clearly, the shares of expected revenue lost at minimum bids at levels of C200 and C250
are amplified for older players in the age-group, since the respective optimal reserve prices
decline as age increases and thus are exceedingly outvalued. Consistent with the above
argument that bidder competition triggers a compensating effect, for reserve prices below
r∗j , i.e. rj ∈ {0, C50, C100}, the measured deviations remain relatively constant.
Figure 8: Share of Expected Revenue Lost (Age-Group 17)
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44For an analogous illustration for age-groups eighteen and nineteen see Figure 13 in Appendix 6.
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Result 6 (Loss of expected revenue): The impact of a suboptimal reserve price depends
on the direction of the deviation from its optimal level. Downward deviations, i.e. setting a
non-binding reserve price, are largely countervailed by the fact that competition among the
potential bidders is sufficiently intense. In contrast, upward deviations can cause substantial
reductions in expected revenue.
Summarizing, though suboptimal from a theoretical perspective, the large number of zero
reserve prices and cluster points we observe in our data not necessarily trigger severe losses
in revenue. As long as the reserve price is set below its optimal level, the competitive
environment of the transfer market suffices to guarantee an almost optimal expected revenue
for the seller, though he will not succeed to additionally extract some of the winning bidder’s
surplus. In contrast, a large fraction of sellers loses a substantial share of expected revenue
by setting a reserve price too high, thereby increasing the probability that the player remains
unsold.
5 Conclusion
We examine empirically how managers playing the online game Hattrick set reserve prices
in auctions for virtual players. Using detailed field data on 6,258 auctions from HT ’s transfer
market, we find that chosen reserve prices exhibit both, very sophisticated and suboptimal
behavior by the sellers. Reserve prices pick up the birthday effect of the demand side
documented in Englmaier & Schmo¨ller (2009) and are adjusted remarkably nuanced to the
resulting sales price pattern. All our results are robust if we additionally control for the
experience of sellers, the auction-end-day, and time-of-day effects.
Intriguingly, even though HT ’s transfer market is highly competitive, we find evidence con-
sistent with a sunk cost fallacy and a resulting entitlement effect in form of a large positive
premium on the reserve price when a player has been previously acquired.
While many sellers act strategically and try to reap some of the buyers’ surplus, some fail
in this endeavor as they set reserve prices suboptimally. We have established that reserve
prices are too clustered (around e 50,000 steps) to be consistent with fully rational behavior
and we document what share of expected revenues is foregone by this. We thus conjecture
that many HT managers simplify their decision making by adopting heuristic pricing rules
that are suboptimal from a fully rational point of view.
If, as in our data, the entitlement and clustering effects are persistent and quantitatively
relevant, the option of choosing a reserve price might be an impediment to market efficiency
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as sellers set too high reserve prices resulting in too little trade. In such situations a social
planner might want to avoid using a reserve price in the design of an auction format to
prevent this potential distortion.
On the upside, our findings suggest that simple microeconomic theory gives us a lot of mileage
in explaining market behavior in complex environments. We document that (the majority
of) sellers very finely adjust their behavior to demand patterns and try to strategically
exploit potential arbitrage possibilities. Moreover, we are able to show that the adoption of
heuristic pricing rules by the sellers does not affect the expected revenue from an auction
dramatically, as long as the chosen reserve price lies below the optimal level and competition
among the bidders is sufficiently intense.
Clearly, more research on the behavior of sellers under different auction formats is needed to
improve our understanding of the determinants and effects of reserve prices and to evaluate
the efficiency of different market designs. Much of the existing evidence derives from field
data or field experiments. Hence, it might be worthwhile to conduct controlled laboratory
experiments with focus on the supply side of auction markets. They allow for a systematic
variation of the design features that might possibly drive the behavioral patterns observed
in the field, while at the same time resolving many factors of uncertainty like the lack of
knowledge of the underlying valuation primitive. Alternatively, as a way of bridging the
gap between the lab and the field, virtual economies like HT may also serve as platforms to
conduct controlled economic and social experiments. Although considerably more complex
than most laboratory experiments, and despite the missing monetary incentives, the findings
presented in this and other studies (see e.g. Trautmann & Traxler, 2009, Castronova, 2008,
and Nicklisch & Salz, 2008) suggest that they provide a market framework which adheres to
standard economic constraints while still providing a considerable degree of control.
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6 Appendix
Table 7: Denomination of Skill Levels
Skill Label Integer Score Skill Label Integer Score
non-existent 0 brilliant 11
disastrous 1 magnificent 12
wretched 2 world class 13
poor 3 supernatural 14
weak 4 titanic 15
inadequate 5 extra-terrestrial 16
passable 6 mythical 17
solid 7 magical 18
excellent 8 utopian 19
formidable 9 divine 20
outstanding 10
Table 8: Determinants of Price Unconditional on Sale (Tobit)
Dep.Var.: price Coeff. Std. Dev
days17 -1609.81∗∗∗ 64.72
days18 -138.30∗∗ 56.70
days19 -10.70 49.68
age18 -173269.62∗∗∗ 5834.23
age19 -196106.93∗∗∗ 5644.17
tsi 88.22∗∗∗ 4.75
acquired -13578.76∗∗∗ 3203.95
Intercept 79122.68∗∗∗ 16476.41
skills yes
character yes
daytime yes
weekday yes
LR Chi(28) 2587.09
N (1515 left-cens. at 0) 6258
Notes: The TOBIT procedure also includes failed auctions with a sales price
of zero (left-censored). Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks
denote statistical significance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
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Table 9: Expected Revenues for Age-Group 18 (Cohorts 17-32)
I II III IV V VI VII
Coh. Obs. Π˜(r∗j ) Π˜(r
mean
j ) Π˜(r
med
j ) Π˜(0) Π˜(C50) Π˜(C100) Π˜(C150)
17 102 113,912 111,070 110,433 109,007 109,656 113,710 109,149
(-2.5%) (-3.1%) (-4.3%) (-3.7%) (-0.2%) (-4.2%)
18 125 94,990 92,663 91,217 89,365 90,691 94,950 85,867
(-2.5%) (-4.0%) (-5.9%) (-4.5%) (-0.0%) (-9.6%)
19 111 94,375 91,187 91,173 88,780 90,075 94,344 85,405
(-3.4%) (-3.4%) (-5.9%) (-4.6%) (-0.0%) (-9.5%)
20 116 88,289 84,047 84,025 82,346 84,025 88,089 77,669
(-4.8%) (-4.8%) (-6.7%) (-4.8%) (-0.2%) (-12.%)
21 119 94,140 89,874 89,841 88,517 89,841 94,101 85,025
(-4.5%) (-4.6%) (-6.0%) (-4.6%) (-0.0%) (-9.7%)
22 123 87,899 85,079 83,643 81,905 83,643 87,664 77,068
(-3.2%) (-4.8%) (-6.8%) (-4.8%) (-0.3%) (-12.%)
23 125 86,968 82,985 82,722 80,918 82,722 86,692 75,909
(-4.6%) (-4.9%) (-7.0%) (-4.9%) (-0.3%) (-12.%)
24 141 99,835 96,692 95,533 94,534 95,533 99,830 92,529
(-3.1%) (-4.3%) (-5.3%) (-4.3%) (-0.0%) (-7.3%)
25 115 85,880 81,979 81,645 79,771 81,645 85,559 74,592
(-4.5%) (-4.9%) (-7.1%) (-4.9%) (-0.4%) (-13.%)
26 117 89,884 86,234 85,611 84,001 85,611 89,722 79,524
(-4.1%) (-4.8%) (-6.5%) (-4.8%) (-0.2%) (-11.%)
27 104 81,142 77,587 76,950 74,838 76,950 80,653 69,175
(-4.4%) (-5.2%) (-7.8%) (-5.2%) (-0.6%) (-14.%)
28 105 82,464 78,741 78,280 76,126 78,280 81,944 70,390
(-4.5%) (-5.1%) (-7.7%) (-5.1%) (-0.6%) (-14.%)
29 124 86,198 83,066 82,254 80,191 81,944 85,954 75,314
(-3.6%) (-4.6%) (-7.0%) (-4.9%) (-0.3%) (-12.%)
30 136 81,068 76,603 76,890 74,710 76,890 80,529 68,930
(-5.5%) (-5.2%) (-7.8%) (-5.2%) (-0.7%) (-15.%)
31 139 82,104 78,925 77,932 75,719 77,932 81,539 69,886
(-3.9%) (-5.1%) (-7.8%) (-5.1%) (-0.7%) (-14.%)
32 131 74,430 70,400 70,180 67,772 70,336 73,587 61,488
(-5.4%) (-5.7%) (-8.9%) (-5.5%) (-1.1%) (-17.%)
Notes: Deviations from the maximum expected revenue are stated in parentheses.
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Table 10: Expected Revenues for Age-Group 19 (Cohorts 33-48)
I II III IV V VI
Coh. Obs. Π˜(r∗j ) Π˜(r
mean
j ) Π˜(r
med
j ) Π˜(0) Π˜(C50) Π˜(C100)
33 160 73,387 68,706 67,818 66,271 69,454 72,032
(-6.4%) (-7.6%) (-9.7%) (-5.4%) (-1.8%)
34 165 72,115 66,423 66,506 64,729 68,289 70,451
(-7.9%) (-7.8%) (-10.%) (-5.3%) (-2.3%)
35 151 64,982 59,187 58,430 56,885 61,477 62,535
(-8.9%) (-10.%) (-12.%) (-5.4%) (-3.8%)
36 144 69,869 64,070 64,167 62,360 66,096 68,065
(-8.3%) (-8.2%) (-10.%) (-5.4%) (-2.6%)
37 127 64,422 58,422 57,873 56,337 60,911 61,987
(-9.3%) (-10.%) (-12.%) (-5.4%) (-3.8%)
38 118 68,667 62,415 62,218 60,893 65,011 66,566
(-9.1%) (-9.4%) (-11.%) (-5.3%) (-3.1%)
39 138 71,575 65,288 65,836 64,306 67,702 70,045
(-8.8%) (-8.0%) (-10.%) (-5.4%) (-2.1%)
40 139 68,075 62,068 62,023 60,377 64,386 66,058
(-8.8%) (-8.9%) (-11.%) (-5.4%) (-3.0%)
41 175 73,928 68,342 68,208 66,746 70,021 72,498
(-7.6%) (-7.7%) (-9.7%) (-5.3%) (-1.9%)
42 152 66,852 61,839 60,371 58,983 63,240 64,647
(-7.5%) (-9.7%) (-11.%) (-5.4%) (-3.3%)
43 138 70,707 64,875 65,077 63,113 66,971 68,806
(-8.2%) (-8.0%) (-10.%) (-5.3%) (-2.7%)
44 165 64,965 59,139 58,816 56,673 61,554 62,321
(-9.0%) (-9.5%) (-12.%) (-5.3%) (-4.1%)
45 186 68,156 62,728 61,705 60,374 64,504 66,046
(-8.0%) (-9.5%) (-11.%) (-5.4%) (-3.1%)
46 169 64,349 57,849 57,868 56,480 60,736 62,144
(-10.%) (-10.%) (-12.%) (-5.6%) (-3.4%)
47 137 63,836 57,752 58,187 55,721 60,340 61,370
(-9.5%) (-8.9%) (-12.%) (-5.5%) (-3.9%)
48 171 68,474 62,479 62,021 60,688 64,823 66,360
(-8.8%) (-9.4%) (-11.%) (-5.3%) (-3.1%)
Notes: Deviations from the maximum expected revenue are stated in parentheses.
Figure 9: Distribution of Auction End-Times
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Notes: During a typical day, the time of the auction deadlines is
approximately similarly distributed as the number of simultaneously
logged-on users. During the early morning hours CET we observe
the lowest traffic with roughly 7,000 online users at its minimum,
while during the peak-periods between 5:30 p.m. and 10 p.m. levels
up to 75,000 simultaneously online users are reached.
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Figure 10: Transfer Market - Search Mask
Figure 11: Transfer Market - Search Results Overview
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Figure 12: Distribution of the Number of Bids
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Notes: The graph depicts the distribution of the number of bids observed in the
sample of 17,510 Hattrick-auctions that was analyzed in Englmaier & Schmo¨ller
(2009). We employ this information as a proxy for the number of bidders in the
estimation of the valuation primitive.
Figure 13: Share of Expected Revenue Lost for Age-Groups 18 and 19
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